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Abstract 
At the peak of the Global Financial Crisis in fall 2008, each of the 27 member states in the 
European Union (EU) set many of its own banking rules and had its own bank regulators and 
supervisors. The crisis made the shortcomings of this decentralized approach obvious, and 
since its formation in January 2011, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has been 
developing a “Single Rulebook” that will harmonize banking rules across the EU countries. 
In June 2012, European leaders went even further, committing to a banking union that would 
better coordinate supervision of banks in the then 18-country Eurozone. A key component 
of the banking union was the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which brought banks in 
the Eurozone under supervision of the European Central Bank (ECB), with day-to-day 
assistance from existing national authorities. This case reviews the changes in Eurozone 
bank regulation and supervision resulting from the Single Supervisory Mechanism.  
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is one of four produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) considering the 
European Banking Union. The following are the other case studies in this case series: 
• European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism 
• European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution—Fortis Group  
• European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution—Dexia Group  
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises. 
2 Director, The Global Financial Crisis Project and Senior Editor, Yale Program on Financial Stability. 
3 Principal Expert, European Central Bank, Directorate Financial Stability, Financial Services Policy Division. 
This co-author’s contribution represents his personal opinions and does not necessarily reflect the views of the 
European Central Bank or its staff. 
4 Janet L. Yellen Professor of Finance and Management, and YPFS Program Director, Yale School of Management.  
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1.   Introduction  
On November 3, 2013, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) went into effect. The SSM 
provided for a system of supervision of the largest, systemically important banks in the then 
18 European Union (EU) member states that used the euro as their central currency (the 
Eurozone) and other participating EU members. 
The SSM radically altered bank supervision in participating countries. While many 
regulations affecting commerce in the EU had been harmonized since the 1950s, each 
member state continued to have its own bank regulator and supervisor. Each country made 
many of its own banking rules and followed its own procedures when a bank within its 
borders failed and needed to be rescued (subject to review and approval by the European 
Commission). However, the recent crises highlighted the shortcomings of this decentralized 
approach. 
The SSM introduced a shared pan-European bank regulatory system. As of November 4, 
2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) had ultimate authority over all banks subject to the 
SSM. The ECB also continued in its previous role as the central banking authority regarding 
the euro and responsible for monetary policy. 
The ECB supervised systemically important banks deemed “significant” under the SSM.5 
Those banks deemed “less significant” under the SSM (approximately 6,000) would continue 
to be supervised on a daily basis by their national supervisory authorities (NSAs) with ECB 
oversight. (In the majority of member states, the NSA was the central bank.) Uniformity of 
supervision under the SSM was further enhanced by the fact that both the ECB and the NSAs 
would apply the Single Rulebook of harmonized banking regulations being drafted by the 
EBA.  
Prior to November 4, 2014, when ECB supervision began, the ECB was charged with 
performing numerous implementation tasks and with conducting a “Comprehensive 
Assessment” of the likely significant banks. The Comprehensive Assessment was intended to 
provide an early assessment of the banks’ financial condition and an opportunity to increase 
their stability, for example, by requiring increased bank capital, prior to the commencement 
of ECB supervision.  
The rest of this module is organized as follows. Section 2 describes circumstances giving rise 
to the EU bank reform of which the SSM is a part. Section 3 describes the institutions that are 
covered by the SSM and how they will be supervised. Section 4 discusses the Supervisory 
Model that has been developed. Section 5 discusses the Comprehensive Assessment being 
undertaken by the ECB. Section 6 explains the structure created to govern the SSM. Section 
7 covers the Single Rulebook and its interface with the SSM, and Section 8 addresses the 
related Deposit Guarantee Schemes. 
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 See ECB Report: AGGREGATE REPORT ON THE COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT for a list of the significant 
banks. As of January 1, 2015, Lithuania began using the euro and became a participating member state under 
the SSM. Accordingly, the number of banks directly supervised by the ECB increased by three to include the 
three largest banks in Lithuania (ECB 2014A). 
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1. Could there be a conflict between the ECB’s monetary policy tasks and its new bank 
supervisory role, and how does the SSM attempt to mitigate these potential conflicts?  
2. Does a shared supervisory structure that vests primary supervision in the ECB, but 
outsources monitoring and supervision of smaller banks to the NSAs, pose any 
challenge to a system of “single” supervision?  
3. Does the SSM go far enough in creating a uniform EU banking sector even though its 
application is limited to Eurozone banks?  
4. Will the SSM enable the ECB to protect the euro in the event of another sovereign debt 
crisis? 
2. The SSM and EU Bank Reform 
The origins of the EU can be traced back to the 1950s, when Belgium, France, West Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands joined in a Common Market. By the peak of the global 
financial crisis in the fall of 2008, the EU had grown to 27 members, and a 28th country 
(Croatia) joined after that. 
A central goal of the EU is the continuing development of a single market involving the free 
movement of goods, services, capital, and people across the borders of the EU member states. 
However, within the EU there are differences as to the level of integration into the union. 
Nineteen of the EU countries (referred to as the Eurozone) use the euro as their common 
currency, while other EU member states, most notably the United Kingdom (UK), continue 
to use and manage their own currencies (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Eurozone and EU Countries 
 
Figure does not reflect Lithuania’s new status.  Source: www.stratfor.com. 
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The global financial crisis of 2007-09 and the sovereign debt crisis that began in 2009 
highlighted the challenges of responding to market events that impacted the euro and trying 
to protect a common currency when the banking sector was highly decentralized and 
governed by a variety of rules. Member states’ regulations varied greatly and did not provide 
common remedies for early intervention or resolution. Also, critical definitions and 
processes differed.  
As a result, the EU proposed several reforms to stabilize financial institutions and markets. 
The earliest reforms included the Single Rulebook, to be developed by the newly formed 
(2011) European Banking Authority, enhanced capital requirements (Capital Requirements 
Directive and Regulation [CRD]), a common framework to manage recovery and resolution 
of troubled and failing banks (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive [BRRD]), and 
enhancement of depository guarantees to a minimum of €100,000 per depositor/per bank 
(See the directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [DGS]). These reforms established uniform 
prudential standards applicable to all banks in the 28 EU member states. 
As the financial crisis evolved into the sovereign debt crisis, it became clear that additional 
actions were needed to place the banking sector in the Eurozone on a sounder footing and 
to restore confidence in the euro. In June 2012, a proposal was floated to create a single EU 
Banking Union to ensure common implementation of the new banking standards in the 
Eurozone. The Banking Union consisted of three6 pillars: a Single Supervisory Mechanism, a 
Single Resolution Mechanism with a Common Resolution Fund, and Harmonized Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes (See Figure 2).7 
3. Which Institutions Are Covered by the Single Supervisory Mechanism? 
Under the SSM, the ECB was granted area-wide supervisory authority over the 
approximately 6,000 European banks operating in participating member states, a group 
which encompassed only those member states that utilized the euro as their central 
currency, but which could expand at any time to include members not using the euro. 
Compliance with the SSM by Eurozone member states was mandatory. Countries that were 
candidates for EU membership were required to adopt the euro as their central currency 
once they qualified to become member states and, at such time, would become subject to the 
SSM. This was the case with Lithuania, which began using the euro and became subject to 
the SSM as of January 1, 2015. 
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6 The Single Rulebook being developed by the European Banking Authority has at times also been referred to 
as a fourth pillar of the banking reform. 
7 The SSM and Deposit Guarantee Schemes are discussed in this case. The Single Resolution Mechanism and 
Common Resolution Fund are discussed in Wiggins, et al. 2014B. See also European Commission (2012) for 
further discussion of the Banking Union. 
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Figure 2: The European Banking Union 
 
Source: European Central Bank. 
 
EU member states that did not use the euro as their central currency could opt to participate 
in the SSM by entering into a Close Cooperation Agreement (CCA) with the ECB and 
voluntarily agreeing to be subjected to SSM supervision. Without a CCA in place, banks 
located in the UK and other non-Eurozone member states would not be subject to the SSM 
or supervised by the ECB. Banks of all sizes situated in these countries would continue to be 
supervised by their NSA. 
Decision ECB/2014/5 prescribing the procedure for entering into a CCA became effective on 
February 27, 2014. In June of 2014, it was rumored that Bulgaria might request a CCA, 
following a financial crisis in the country that included runs on many of its banks 
(Kostantinova 2014). However, the ECB reported in its August 2014 SSM Quarterly Report 
that it had not yet received any formal requests to enter into a CCA, but the ECB did comment 
that it had received “informal expressions of interests from some member states” (which it 
did not name) and that it was meeting with these member states (ECB, SSM Quarterly Report 
2014/3, 13).  
Credit Institutions  
Under the SSM, ECB supervision was limited to “credit institutions,” which were defined by 
the SSM as: 
Any institution that is either (i) an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other 
repayable funds from the public and to grant credit for its own account, or (ii) an undertaking 
or any other legal person, other than those under (i), which issues means of payment in the 
form of electronic money (ECB EU Glossary). 
Investment companies, hedge funds, and insurance companies were therefore not covered. 
This could result in anomalies such as the insurance arm of a financial institution being 
supervised at the national level, when the banking arm was supervised at the European level. 
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However, it should be noted that risks arising from participation in entities included in the 
consolidated group but not supervised as credit institutions under the SSM (i.e., supervised 
by other authorities, such as insurance supervisors, or not supervised at all) were also to be 
considered by the supervisory authority. 
Moreover, the SSM left “non-prudential” supervisory tasks to the national regulators, rather 
than transferring them to the ECB. Notably, these tasks included supervision of markets in 
financial instruments and consumer protection.  
Significant and Less Significant Institutions 
As of November 4, 2014, the ECB directly supervised those credit institutions deemed 
“significant” under the SSM. A credit institution/bank was deemed to be significant if it met 
one of the following five conditions based on total assets (SSM Framework Regulation, 
Article 39[3]): 
• The value of its assets exceeded €30 billion. 
• The value of its assets exceeded both €5 billion and 20% of the gross domestic 
product of the member state in which it was located. 
• The bank was among the three most significant banks of the member state in which 
it was located. 
• The bank had large cross-border activities. 
• The bank received assistance from a Eurozone bailout fund.  
The SSM provided that significant banks were to be supervised at the highest level of 
consolidation within the Eurozone, which would include their parent holding companies. 
Banking groups which encompass several banks were counted as one institution. 
On September 4, 2014, the ECB published its final list of credit institutions determined to be 
significant and that it would directly supervise as of November 4, 2014. Based on updated 
data, as of January 15, 2015, the ECB directly supervised 123 bank groups in 19 member 
states, which collectively represented 82% of total banking assets in the Eurozone (ECB 
FAQs).  
Supervision of all other banks subject to the SSM—those deemed “less significant”—was 
delegated to the NSAs of the respective member states in which the banks were located. The 
NSAs would continue to supervise these entities but would apply a harmonized regulatory 
regime, the Single Rule Book. The ECB, however, retained final supervisory authority over 
these banks and might, at any time, assume a direct supervisory role on its own initiative or 
on the request of a member state. The NSAs retained all supervisory tasks not specifically 
conferred on the ECB by the SSM (SSM Regulation, Article 28). Given the shared supervisory 
scheme, the SSM recognized that the success of the overall scheme depended on a high level 
of cooperation between the ECB and the NSAs. 
A bank might change status from significant to less significant by failing to meet the 
definition of significant (on a singular or consolidated basis) for three consecutive years, in 
which case it would become subject to direct supervision by its NSA. Also, a less significant 
bank could become subject to direct supervision by the ECB at any time due to an acquisition 
or merger of assets, or through organic growth, which caused it to satisfy the definition of 
significant. 
Banks Not Subject to the SSM 
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While the ECB would directly supervise banks holding 82% of the assets held by Eurozone 
banks, this represented only 56.7% of total assets held by EU banks. A large share of EU bank 
assets was held by UK banks (23.6%), which were not subject to the SSM (See Figure 3). 
Therefore, the banking union’s reach did not extend across the entire EU. However, as 
discussed below, the Single Rulebook and other bank reform directives, which were 
mandatory in all member states, did mitigate this regulatory gap. 
Figure 3: Total Assets of Credit Institutions in EU Member States (June 2011) 
 
Source: European Central Bank 
 
4. The SSM Supervisory Model  
Pursuant to the SSM, the ECB’s duties included all functions critical to ensuring 
microprudential stability of the banks supervised, which included: authorizing banks, 
branches, and extensions of services, or withdrawing existing authorizations; approving 
mergers and acquisitions; requiring and monitoring that banks maintain robust governance 
procedures, risk-management processes and other internal controls; conducting stress tests; 
supervising parent organizations on a consolidated basis; and supervising recovery plans 
and instituting early intervention as required (SSM Framework Regulation, Article 35). The 
ECB was also responsible for ensuring coordinated functioning of the SSM and 
harmonization among the NSAs. 
SSM regulations state that the SSM was committed to maintaining high supervisory 
standards and that it was intended that the SSM would be benchmarked against 
international standards and best practices. Equally important, the SSM was intended to 
ensure consistency within the framework of the European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS) and the Single Rulebook.  
As required by the SSM regulations, on April 16, 2014, the ECB adopted a regulation (the SSM 
Framework Regulation) setting out the practical arrangements of implementing the SSM and 
further delineating the tasks prescribed to the ECB. Figure 4 describes how these duties were 
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distributed among the ECB and the NSAs under the SSM, with respect to the significant and 
less significant banks, respectively.  
Figure 4: SSM Distribution of Competencies 
 
Source: European Central Bank. 
 
The Supervisory Board (the body responsible for the ECB’s supervisory duties, as discussed 
below) would provide additional procedural details in the SSM Supervisory Manual, an 
internal SSM staff document. However, the ECB also published a Guide to Banking 
Supervision that was publicly available. Collectively, the SSM Framework Regulation and the 
SM Supervisory Manual set forth the supervisory model for the SSM and specified the 
procedures to be followed by the ECB and NSAs in supervising significant and less significant 
banks, as well as many other related elements of SSM operations. It was yet to be seen, 
however, how the SSM Supervisory Manual would interact and possibly overlap with the 
Single Rulebook. 
Joint Supervisory Teams 
A hallmark of the SSM supervisory model is that each significant banking group would be 
assigned a Joint Supervisory Team (JST) composed of an ECB Coordinator and members from 
the ECB and NSA staffs from the member states in which the group operates. This structure 
would allow the ECB to make optimal use of existing local expertise, while at the same time, 
ensuring consistency across SSM supervised banks. According to a 2014 article in the SSM 
Quarterly Report: 
Both in terms of size and expertise, each JST will be set up and staffed in a way that is tailored 
specifically to suit its supervised institution’s business model, risk profile and geographical 
distribution, involving all of the ECB and NCA supervisors working on the supervision of a 
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specific bank. This allows for a highly integrated approach to the supervision of cross-border 
banks, enabling the JST to conduct its activities with a view to the institution’s specific risk 
profile and to ensure that the institution complies with the legal and prudential framework 
on an ongoing and forward-looking basis (SSM Quarterly Report 2014/1, 9). 
The JST would be responsible for coordinating all aspects of the supervised entity or group’s 
compliance with the SSM: planning and implementing the SSM Review and Evaluation 
Process (SSM REP), monitoring compliance with any corrective measures prescribed, and 
ensuring compliance with decisions made by the supervisory board and the governing 
council (SSM Framework Regulation, Articles 3-6). The JSTs would be supplemented and 
aided by subject matter specialists from the ECB. 
Methodologies and Processes 
The SSM SREP contained in the SSM Framework Regulation and SSM Supervisory Manual 
would guide supervision and review of both significant and less significant institutions. It 
was the SSM “playbook” and provided detailed procedures regarding a wide variety of 
operational issues, including: 
SSM Risk Assessment System (RAS). A system that would be “rooted in quantitative indicators 
and qualitative inputs” and would utilize methodologies for assessing risk by individual 
categories (i.e., business risk, credit risk, liquidity risk) and would also evaluate internal 
governance and risk management procedures.  
SSM SREP Quantification. A methodology for the evaluation and review of capital assessment, 
liquidity buffer qualification, stress testing, and supervisory measures and communications. 
An approach to integrate the RAS, the SREP quantification and the stress test outcomes. The 
SSM designed its SREP as an integrated approach, which combined these elements in a 
meaningful way to determine its outcomes. Depending on this outcome, supervisors could 
impose a wide range of measures on institutions, including changes to their risk 
management practices and processes, as well as capital and liquidity changes to 
requirements above the minimum obligations under the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(commonly called “Pillar I requirements”) (SSM Quarterly Report, 2014/1, 10-11). 
The SREP was designed to allow for maximum integration of SSM resources at the 
centralized ECB level and fluid deployment as needed for each supervised institution.  
The SSM Framework Regulation also described procedures for on-site inspections, which 
would generally be conducted on an ad hoc basis. These might be initiated by the ECB or at 
the request of an NSA.  
5. The Comprehensive Assessment 
Prior to assuming full supervision of the significant banks, the ECB undertook a 
comprehensive review of such banks’ balance sheets and risk profiles, the “Comprehensive 
Assessment.” The Comprehensive Assessment had three main goals:  
• Transparency—enhancing the quality of information available concerning the 
condition of banks;  
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• Repair—identifying and implementing necessary corrective actions, if and where 
needed; and  
• Confidence building—increasing confidence that banks are fundamentally sound 
and trustworthy.  
On October 26, 2014, the ECB published the results of the Comprehensive Assessments on 
130 financial groups in 18 member states, which included the 120 significant banks subject 
to ECB supervision.8 The assessment included detailed information regarding each bank 
reviewed, including any corrective recommendations required (ECB 2014B). 
Asset Quality Review 
The Comprehensive Assessment consisted of two parts: (1) an asset quality review and (2) 
a stress test (ECB 2013). The Asset Quality Review evaluated the quantity and quality of 
banks’ capital assets against a threshold of 8% Common Equity Tier 1 capital.9 Banks failing 
to meet this threshold would be required to adopt corrective measures, including the 
requirement to raise additional capital, which the ECB had the authority to monitor and 
enforce (Ibid., 2). 
This total Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of 8% was applicable to all of the banks covered by 
the Comprehensive Assessment. It was calculated as a ratio to risk-weighted assets, derived 
from the Asset Quality Review, including any necessary adjustment to the risk weights (ECB 
2014B) (See European Central Bank, Note: Comprehensive Assessment, October 2013, for 
details regarding the asset review. Also see ECB Press Release: ECB publishes manual for 
asset quality review, 11 March 2014.). 
Stress Tests 
Originally instituted in response to the financial crisis, the EBA had conducted stress tests 
since 2009. However, the results had not been well-received, as many criticized them for 
being too lax.  
In 2010, amid the early stages of the sovereign debt crisis, questions abounded regarding the 
test’s rigor. Just 7 of 91 banks failed the tests, the results of which indicated that the failed 
banks required an infusion of only €3.5 billion in additional capital to be able to withstand a 
serious downturn. Notably, Ireland's banks were given a clean bill of health only to be bailed 
out four months later (See YPFS case studies: Zeissler, et al 2014A and Zeissler, et al. 2014B). 
Similarly, in July 2011, as the sovereign debt crisis battered the region, only 8 of 90 tested 
banks (in 21 countries) failed. The tests indicated that the failed banks needed only €2.5 
billion in additional capital to survive a serious downturn. Another 16 banks passed, with 
capital ratios barely above the then-required threshold of 5% but were advised to also raise 
additional capital. Notably, the Franco-Belgian bank Dexia10 passed, seemingly a turnaround 
success story after having been bailed out in 2008. But just three months later, the bank had 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
8 On September 4, 2014, the ECB published a final adjusted list of the 120 significant institutions that it will 
directly supervise as of November 4, 2014 (ECB 2014C). 
9 This threshold was composed of a baseline Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of 4.5%, plus a 2.5% capital 
conservation buffer. An add-on of 1% was added to take into account the systemic relevance of the banks 
considered significant under the SSM Regulation.  
10 Dexia, which was being wound down, was exempted from the 2014 stress tests but would be directly 
supervised by the ECB as of November 4, 2014. 
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to request government assistance due to huge exposures to Greek sovereign bonds (further 
discussed in YPFS case study Wiggins, el al. 2014D). 
By comparison to the original €2.5 billion estimate of capital shortfall indicated by the stress 
tests, the International Monetary Fund later estimated that the EU banks might require as 
much as an additional €300 billion to withstand the effects of the sovereign debt crisis 
(Rastello 2011). 
The 2014 Stress Tests 
On April 29, 2014, the EBA published the final methodology, adverse scenarios, and 
templates to be used by the banks involved in yet another round of stress tests. The 2014 
baseline scenarios relied on EU gross domestic product (GDP) forecasts, but the adverse 
scenarios were adjusted to cover a wide range of risks, including credit risks, market risks, 
exposures to securitization, and sovereign and funding risks.11  
To pass the test, banks had to show that their Common Equity Tier 1 capital wouldn’t fall 
below 8% of risk-weighted assets if the EU economy followed the baseline scenario. Banks 
were required to maintain a buffer of Common Equity Tier 1 capital of at least 5.5% of risk-
weighted assets in the adverse scenario (EBA April 2014, 14). As shown in Figure 5, the 2014 
tests incorporated adverse scenarios more severe than those used in previous years. 
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
11 The 2014 adverse scenarios reflect the systemic risks that were viewed as then currently representing the 
greatest threats to the stability of the EU banking sector: “(i) an increase in global bond yields amplified by an 
abrupt reversal in risk assessment, especially towards emerging market economies, (ii) a further deterioration 
of credit quality in countries with feeble demand, (iii) stalling policy reforms jeopardizing confidence in the 
sustainability of public finances; and (iv) the lack of necessary bank balance sheet repair to maintain affordable 
market funding” (EBA April 2014). The shocks include stress in the commercial real estate market and foreign 
exchange shock in Central and Eastern Europe. 
123
European Banking Union A Wiggins et al.




Figure 5: Comparison of 2014 EU Stress Tests with Earlier Tests 
 
Source: Speech: Ignazio Angeloni: Stress-testing banks: are econometric models growing young 
again? (08/01/2014).  
The 2014 tests also altered the treatment of sovereign debt held by banks. Unlike in prior 
years, sovereign debt securities held in a bank’s trading book would have to be marked to 
market, and any losses would have to be immediately realized. “Those sovereign assets held 
as hold to maturity would be subject to a shift in the risk weights based on internal model 
assessments of changes in credit risk. The treatments of securities that were held as available 
for sale were marked to market too, but the capital impact would depend on choices made 
by supervisors” (EBA FAQs April 2014) (Additional details regarding the stress test can be 
found in EBA January 2014A.). 
Results of the 2014 Comprehensive Assessment 
On October 26, the EBA published the final results of the 2014 comprehensive assessment 
and stress tests. The key results were: 
• Capital shortfall of €25 billion detected at 25 participant banks. 
• Banks’ asset values needed to be adjusted by €48 billion, €37 billion of which did not 
generate capital shortfall.  
• Shortfall of €25 billion and asset value adjustment of €37 billion implied overall 
impact of €62 billion on banks.  
• Additional €136 billion found in nonperforming exposures.  
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• Adverse stress scenario would deplete banks’ capital by €263 billion, reducing 
median CET1 ratio by four percentage points from 12.4% to 8.3% (see ECB 2014A 
and ECB 2014D). 
 
The results were generally viewed as more stringent and transparent than in previous years 
and a successful preparation for the new SSM regime. Since the Comprehensive Assessment 
was announced in July 2013, 30 of the largest banks had taken measures to strengthen their 
balance sheets by more than €200 billion, including raising €60 billion in capital. Many 
banks had already covered a capital shortfall revealed by the test (The assessment was 
completed as of December 31, 2013). The 25 banks that failed the test had two weeks to 
submit a proposal for increasing their required capital and nine months to cover the 
shortfall.12  
6. Governance and Administration  
By treaty, only the Eurozone countries have decision-making authority within the ECB. A 
new decision-making process was created to accommodate non-Eurozone countries that 
choose to join the SSM. A new ECB entity, the Supervisory Board, will act to make most 
decisions under the SSM and recommend decisions to the ECB’s ultimate decision-making 
body, the Governing Council. The new process also effectuates the SSM’s mandate for the 
ECB to separate its supervisory function from its monetary policy duties. Consistent with this 
mandate, the Governing Council will hold separate meetings to consider Supervisory Board 
recommendations or other supervisory matters. The SSM governance structure and 
decision-making structure are outlined in Figure 6. 
The Supervisory Board 
The Supervisory Board was to be made up of representatives from the ECB and all NSAs from 
participating member states. The Supervisory Board would make most decisions under the 
SSM, with Supervisory Board rulings becoming final unless vetoed by the Governing Council 
within ten days (SSM Quarterly Report 2014/1, 4-5). A Steering Committee composed of a 
chair, a vice chair, an ECB member of the Supervisory Committee, and five members of the 
Supervisory Committee from NSA member states would be charged with supporting the 
activities of the Supervisory Board (SSM Quarterly Report 2014/2, 4). 
An Administrative Board of Review composed of five persons with sufficient experience in 
the fields of banking and finance would review internal decisions by the ECB to ensure that 
they were in compliance with SSM Regulations. In the event of disagreement, any NSA could 
appeal a Governing Council’s blocking of a Supervisory Board decision to a high-level 
mediation panel, comprised of one member from each SSM participating member state, 
chosen from among members of the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board (Ibid. 5). 
Lastly, the mediation panel would resolve, if requested by an NSA, differences of views 
regarding an objection by the Governing Council to a draft decision prepared by the 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
12 See ECB 2014D for the results of the 2014 Comprehensive Assessment, including detailed results, which can 
be assessed at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr141026.en.html; See also ECB 2014E, 
the transcript of the comprehensive assessment press conference (with Q&A) is available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is141026.en.html. 
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Supervisory Board. The mediation panel would be comprised of one member per 
participating member state (SSM Quarterly Report 2014/2). 
Figure 6: Decision-Making Process of the SSM, Non-Objection Procedure 
 
Source: European Central Bank  
 
Administrative Organization 
In order to perform its new supervisory function and also to maintain separation from its 
monetary policy functions, the ECB established four new Directorates General with an 
estimated total headcount of 770. The Directorates General Macro-Prudential Supervision I 
and II (DGs MPS I and II) would be responsible for the day-to-day supervision of the 120 
significant institutions, with the 30 most systemic banks being assigned to DG MPS I, and the 
balance to DG MPS II. Directorate General Macro-Prudential Supervision III would be 
responsible for indirect supervision of the less significant banks. Directorate General Macro-
Prudential Supervision IV would provide horizontal and specialized services, such as 
planning, modeling, and crisis management expertise, to support the other functions. Lastly, 
a dedicated directorate-level secretariat would support the Supervisory Board in carrying 
out its responsibilities (SSM Quarterly Report 2014/2, 6-7). 
7. The Single Rulebook 
The ECB and NSAs would utilize the Single Rulebook in implementing the SSM and in 
supervising the Eurozone credit institutions. This would help to ensure that all banks met a 
similar standard for critical supervisory elements regardless of which member state they 
operated in. 
The EBA was charged with developing the Single Rulebook in 2011 as part of the ESFS 
reforms adopted in response to the financial crisis. At the time, the then 27 EU member states 
maintained separate supervisors and separate bank regulatory regimes under a system of 
minimal harmonization. Previous European banking legislation was based on a Directive, 
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which required national and/or local governments to adopt laws to further implement them. 
This resulted in widely divergent national standards across the EU, characterized by 
regulatory competition and local favoritism. Moreover, a large cross-border financial 
institution operating in the EU would have to separately comply with each country’s laws. 
This regulatory patchwork enabled institutions to exploit regulatory loopholes and distort 
competition. It was burdensome for firms to operate across the single market represented 
by the EU.  
To address these divergences, the Single Rulebook would be based on regulations, which 
were directly and uniformly effective once enacted, requiring no national or local 
rulemaking. It was expected to result in a more resilient, transparent, and efficient European 
banking sector. Under the Single Rulebook, prudential safeguards would not stop at the 
border, and institutions’ financial stability could be compared across the region or, for 
example, by applying a common definition for classification of instruments as Common Tier 
1 capital and use of a common financial reporting platform (See Enria 2011 for a discussion 
of the rationale put forth by the EBA for the Single Rulebook.).  
8. Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
In April 2014, the European Parliament adopted amendments to the directive regarding 
deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) that ensured that deposits in all member states would be 
guaranteed up to €100,000 per depositor, per bank. The regulation also called for faster 
payouts gradually reducing the required period from 20 to 7 working days. It also sought to 
strengthen the guarantee by requiring a minimum level of ex-ante funding (0.8%) to be met 
in ten years, and to arrange for backup funding sources. Banks would make contributions 
based on their risk levels, with riskier banks being required to contribute more (See 
European Commission MEMO/14/296 for further details.).  
Member states had a year to fully implement the requirements, which fell short of a proposed 
broader overhaul that would have achieved EU harmonization and improved financing of 
schemes.  
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